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I. INTRODUCTION

I appreciate the invitation of the FloridaLaw Review to comment on
Professor Lessig's 2002 Dunwody Lecture, "The Creative Commons."'
Since I agree in a general manner with much of what Professor Lessig says,
I cannot promise the kind of fireworks that often make for good reading.
More specifically, I agree that there is an imbalance in copyright today. As
I indicate in my closing, I believe that the recent retroactive extension of
copyright duration stands as the least defensible cause of this imbalance.
While agreeing in general with Professor Lessig's conclusions, I have
a number of reservations, almost all of which can be traced to the onesided nature of his arguments and a lack of a discernable and consistent
underlying rationale for his views. First, I disagree that the market is able
to determine which creative efforts are most important for cultural
development. Second, I have concerns about an unregulated commons in
which precious resources may be depleted. Third, I oppose what amounts
to a system of taxation without knowing something about those upon
whom the tax will fall. Although these reservations are too broad for
complete treatment here, I do address them below.
My main focus, however, best fits under the rubric "it's not that
simple." Professor Lessig's arguments simplify the problem and conceal
many of the factors that must be accounted for in order to talk in a
meaningful way about solutions. The premise for his lecture seems to be
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law University of Florida Fredric G. Levin
College of Law, Director of Center for Teaching and Research. Thanks to Tom Cotter and Sarah
Wilson for their comments.
1. Lawrence Lessig, The CreativeCommons, 55 FLA. L. REv. 763 (2003).
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that we would be better off if much of what is protected by copyright were
in the public domain. Implicit in this is the idea that we could change the
balance in copyright and leave everything, most particularly the level of
creative activity, more or less the same. I am not certain that this can be
achieved. In fact, chalk it up to plain old greed, but less copyright
protection may mean less creative effort, not just by those with original
ideas, but by those wishing to dip into the commons in order to produce
derivative works. The outcome is that the commons might well be wide
open but relatively infertile and uninteresting. I would suggest that
"Creativity or the Commons" might be as apt a description of the issue as
"Creative Commons."
In this Commentary, I first clarify Professor Lessig's points and discuss
my three concerns. Second, I expand on my notion of a creativitycommons trade-off. Third, I address each of Professor Lessig's examples.
In all of those cases, he has provided a bit of a narrative and I provide the
counter-narrative. I do not claim that the counter-narratives are the correct
ones. Instead, I offer them to illustrate further the trade-off problem and its
complexity. In closing, I concur with one of the Professor's explanations
for the imbalance and explain why I think another one he identifies is of
lesser importance.
II. THE COMMONS, PROFESSOR LESSIG'S PROPOSAL, AND
THREE "SMALL" OBJECTIONS

Professor Lessig is actually proposing what may be best viewed as a
commons beautification project. In order to understand why, think about
the creative commons for a second. They are not a pretty sight. They are
not like the fragile and pristine commons one might envision. Indeed, the
creative commons are littered with all manner of trash and debris-written
versions of abandoned refrigerators or eight-track cassette players. They
resemble the landscape from a "Mad Max" film far more than a national
park. Old scripts from "Three's Company" will eventually find a place in
these commons, perhaps next to Anna Karenina. To be sure, they are
different from the idealized commons in another important way. Each and
every year they are replenished as copyright terms expire. The creative
commons are always expanding, never contracting-at least quantitatively.
What Professor Lessig really wants to add to the mix of the commons
are works that have the highest market value. This must be the case
because it seems unlikely that he is worried about access to works that are
currently protected but have little value. Presumably, access to those works
can be had for a relatively reasonable price. Those who would like to assist
in our cultural development by creating derivative works based on these
low-valued efforts are relatively free to do so. The rub comes with respect
to works that have greater market value. The price for using these works
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may be quite high. When you get right down to it, this is what Professor
Lessig is saying: people who want to use the works of others to create their
own works should have to pay less or nothing to do so. And, this only
matters if prices are high already. I suppose there is no empirical test for
this but, as a personal matter, I do not believe that market value can be
equated with cultural value. Professor Lessig, by stressing only those
creative efforts that today's fad-ridden and oft times superficial market
values, evidently disagrees.
This leads to my second concern. It stems from the fact that the creative
commons do resemble our ideal of the commons in one important way.
Specific elements can be devalued for future use by others. To use one of
Professor Lessig's examples, suppose that Gone With the Wind were not
protected and that a not-very-talented writer decided to write a parody of
that novel from the point of view of a slave. Although the opportunity for
a second and talented writer to come along and write a wonderful parody
is still technically available, the probability is lower that it will occur and
for all practical purposes the commons have become qualitatively less.
When this happens to an important work, it is hard to see it as a matter of
cultural development. In short, I am not comfortable with allowing some
ofour most precious resources-the creativity of individuals-to be simply
tossed into the commons to be exploited by whomever has spare time and
a magic marker. I do not have a ready answer for this but, if I were the
advocate of Professor Lessig's proposal, I would feel obligated to work
through the problem. That means, however, that things could get
intellectually sticky.
My third concern also calls into play more variables than I can handle
here. As I noted, Professor Lessig's argument is that people holding
copyrights sometimes charge too much and that those wanting to use their
works should pay less or nothing. Since philosophically I am generally
against the rich getting richer and all for the commons and cultural
development, his position is enticing. Unfortunately, it seems to have no
anchoring principle. Again, using his example, what is the principle that
would guide us in choosing between Disney shareholders and the Brothers
Grimm, with respect to whom is going to make a buck? Suppose Disney
shareholders are relatively well-to-do and the Brothers Grimm, ifthey were
around today, really were the middle class librarians they were 200 years
ago. I am not keen on taking from the poor and middle class, without
compensation, in order to make the wealthy or even the public better off.
Shortening copyright duration or imposing controls on what one can charge
is really indistinguishable from a tax on creative efforts. Thus, to me there
is something just a tad too cavalier about claims that those who have been
creative should contribute to the commons for the benefit of us all, without
knowing who we are, in effect, taxing.
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THE CREATIVITY/COMMONS TRADE-OFF

Having said all of this, my main concern, as noted earlier, is the tradeoff problem. As I understand it, Professor Lessig's three opening stories
can be distilled to this: Because of the creative commons, we have Disney
characters. Or in the Professor's words, Disney retold the stories "because
they were free to do so."2 Because the commons are not large enough,
Alice Randall did not make as much money from her book, The Wind
Done Gone, as she might have hoped. And, in the case of the jazz-dancing
dog, "one is not free to teach one's dog to dance jazz."3
In all cases-Disney stories, a parody of Gone With the Wind, and the
mechanical dog, whether involving users or abusers of copyright law, these
stories involve creative entities who were willing to share their creativity
with the public. In all likelihood, they did so because of copyright
protection. In other words, these ideas, images, and products came into
existence because there is no absolute creative commons. By an "absolute
commons" I mean a regime in which creativity passes immediately into the
public domain. More generally, in order to get to the point of there being
a creative commons, there must be creativity in the first place. The richer
that creativity, the richer the potential commons. Thus, as far as the
creative commons is concerned, copyright has a chicken-and-egg quality.
Without copyright, it seems doubtful that much would exist to become part
of the commons. Arguably, the more one can internalize the profits from
creativity-i.e., the more copyright protection there is-the greater the
amount of creativity. No one knows the magnitude of this relationship but
it seems indisputable that it cuts only one way. The trade-off, one might
argue, is that if the commons were larger and more accessible, the
generation of derivative works would increase. While this sounds like a
trade-off, it is not clear that it is. There is no reason to believe that people
who create derivative works are any less driven by a desire to internalize
the gains from their efforts than those creating original works. A more
open commons makes it easier for them to create but devalues their
creation.
Consider an example that may seem to (and perhaps does) come from
left field but which is in the news regularly. In the instance of organ
donation, one might say that making an organ available to another is like
the process of creativity. In the United States today it is illegal to sell
organs. 4 In fact, you cannot sell an organ for use even after it is useless to

2. Id. at 764.
3. Id. at 765-66.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2003).
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you.' This is almost the absolute commons, because the choice to
create-make available to others-is unaccompanied by the ability to
internalize any gain from that creation. The opposite end of this spectrum
would be a case in which there is a market for all organs, all the time, at
any age. The issue is whether more organs are available to others under a
system in which they become part of the commons, as is the case now, or
when they can be allocated in a manner that benefits the creator. No one
knows for sure, but there are powerful arguments that more organs would
be available if people were permitted to profit from the sale of organs.' I
do not claim this would be a better or more just world, but that the tradeoff is something to be considered.
IV. STORIES RETOLD
Here are some slight reinterpretations of the Professor's stories in order
to expand on the idea of this trade-off. First, Disney may or may not have
created stories based on the Brothers Grimm if payment were necessary.
We do not know. What we do know is that it was more profitable to do so
since the stories were part of the creative commons. Perhaps the operative
word in Professor Lessig's version of this story is "free." The stories, the
product of another's creative efforts, were free for the taking, and Disney
took. Ironically, they only took because they then could exclude others
from the fruits of their efforts. Or, put differently, they took because they
were assured that they would not be required to contribute to the commons
themselves. Professor Lessig's ideal of a more expansive definition of the
commons could well mean that the Disney stories would not exist at all.'
Second, there is Alice Randall and a party who gets no mention in
Professor Lessig's story-her publisher, Houghton-Mifflin. Presumably
Houghton-Mifflin agreed to publish The Wind Done Gone because it
thought it could turn a dollar by doing so, and, I might add, by keeping her
work from becoming part of the commons for as long as possible. (You
may see a trend here: everyone seems to think it is fine for someone else's
work to be part of the commons.) Professor Lessig suggests that the costs
incurred by Randall and, one assumes, by Houghton-Mifflin were due to
the fact that Gone With the Wind was not yet part of the commons.' This
is true but not in a meaningful sense. It is like saying that the cost I may
incur in defending myself if I take a car that I know is not my own is really
the fault of the law for allowing people to own cars. In Ms. Randall's case,

5. See id.
6. See Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative
Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. REG. 403 (1991).
7. If your response to this is "sounds good," think of another example.
8. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 765.
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there was no doubt that Gone With the Wind was copyrighted.9 And no one
disputes the trial court's description of the level of copying:
The Wind Done Gone uses fifteen fictional characters from
Gone With the Wind, incorporating their physical attributes,
mannerisms, and the distinct features that Ms. Mitchell used
to describe them, as well as their complex relationships with
each other. Moreover, the various locales (Atlanta, Tara or
Tata, Twelve Oaks or Twelve Slaves Strong, Charleston),
settings, characters, themes, and plot of The WindDone Gone
closely mirror those contained in Gone With the Wind.
The earlier work is a third-person epic, whereas the new
work is told in the first-person as an intimate diary of the life
of Cynara. Thematically, the new work provides a different
viewpoint of the antebellum world. This new vision, however,
does not simply comment on the antebellum South by giving
the untold perspective of a mulatto slave who is sold from the
plantation, develops a relationship with a caucasian, lives well
and travels the world. Rather, the new work tells Gone With
the Wind's story, using its characters, settings, and plot. The
new work does not simply make use of non-copyrightable
stock scenes or historical events, like the antebellum South,
Reconstruction, the mistreatment of slaves, or the relationship
between slave and master.' 0
So can we really say that the presence of a less-than-ideal commons
explains why Ms. Randall amassed significant litigation expenses? I doubt
it. Here are a couple of other possibilities. One is that what evolved was a
relatively high stakes gamble in which Houghton-Mifflin was willing to pit
the politically correct The WindDone Gone against the politically incorrect
Mitchell Estate not only in the courtroom but in the court of public
opinion. Indeed, this possibility is suggested by Professor Lessig's own
description of the case in which it is implied there is a "right" decision,
based on subject matter far more than on copyright law." I do not mean to
criticize this form of advocacy, but it has very little to do with whether the
commons are of the proper size.
Another possibility is that Ms. Randall's copying created an important
fair use issue with respect to parodies. This was a close issue because of
the extensiveness of her use of a protected work in order to create her
parody. Thus, the cost to Randall or her publisher arose not because of a

9. Whether copyright protection should continue to exist is another question and, on this,
I agree completely with the Professor.
10. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
11. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 764-65.
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surprise finding that Ms. Randall had inadvertently taken something that
was not yet part of the commons. It was more likely due to the fact that
Houghton-Mifflin decided to invest some money in expanding the
commons. It did this successfully. 2 And, although the cost may have eaten
up some of the profit the publisher expected to make from Randall's work
alone, it is likely to be an investment that will pay off over many derivative
works yet to come. This seems to be precisely the outcome Professor
Lessig supports. He merely objects to the fact that the financial burden fell
on Ms. Randall and, presumably, Houghton-Mifflin. 3 His concern would
likely be diminished if Ms. Randall had somehow been able to internalize
some of the gains for other writers and publishers as a result of the
litigation. Ironically, the reason she cannot is that her efforts and those of
her publisher instantly became part of the commons for future authors.
Third, there is the problem of not being able to teach your "dog" to
dance. I have two quibbles with the Professor's appeal to "pet" owners.
The first is the reference to "one's dog."' 4 My personal nasty little
dachshund may be my dog, but ifI owned an AIBO pet, it is only partly my
dog. Like it or not, the right to circumvent the copyright protection
protocol is not something I purchased. Almost certainly, the price of the
dog would have been much higher if that had been part of the purchase. If
the efforts of Sony were not protected, there would likely be fewer
mechanical dogs and the issue of whether one can teach them to dance
would be irrelevant.
The second quibble relates to my general feeling that Professor Lessig
thinks a broader commons would not affect creativity. The counterinterpretation might go like this. Sony produces a mechanical dog. In the
future, it plans to market upgrades that enable the dog to dance, sing, and
even mix a great martini. If someone is able to bypass the codes without
paying Sony and to make the upgrades available to all with a computer,
Sony has little incentive to invest in the dog. Put differently, one possibility
of taking Professors Lessig's concern to heart would be more commons but
absent a dog as advanced as the one Sony produces. I do not know which
is the better outcome, but not to consider this outcome is like listening to
only half the story.
A final reinterpretation is based on the Professor's general theme that
technology has increased the control of private interests over our cultural
development. On this point he offers two examples. The first is the Adobe
eBook Reader, a technology that intellectual property law no doubt had a
part in bringing to the market. As I understand the argument, the

12. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 2001).
13. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 765.
14. Id. at 765-66.
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technology enables publishers to regulate the dissemination of a book. 5
This is supposedly to be compared to the "ideal" world in which one could
go to a bookstore, buy a book, and do pretty much anything with it except
photocopy it and sell copies. Again this example seems misplaced. In the
good old days, the publisher decided which books were published, the
price of the book, the number produced, and the compensation of the
author. Unless these markets are competitive, that sounds like a large
measure of regulation. But the more important question is whether Adobe
eBook Readers actually increase that control. As far I know, the traditional
methods of accessing a book still exist and no one is required to buy an
eBook Reader with its accompanying regulation. As a matter of
mathematics, if we continue to have the former level of access and add a
highly regulated form of access, that would seem to equal greater access
overall.
Although he references Middlemarch, it may be that the Professor has
in mind books that will be published in eBook format exclusively. This
would be a new level of control over books. On the other hand, as an
empirical matter, it may be that many of these books would not have seen
the light of day but for the technology that permits them to be published as
eBooks. One only needs to think of the proliferation of online publications
to understand how the internet has lowered the cost of dissemination. But
without protection, this dissemination might be far less.
Another example of the trade-off and the commons arises with respect
to Professor Lessig's example of Microsoft's movie-making. 6 One is not
sure whether to applaud the body of intellectual property laws that created
the incentive for such wonderful teaching devices to come into existence
or to decry the fact that people who film the creative efforts of others and
attempt to circulate their works may run into copyright consequences. I do
not want to go into this specific example too deeply, though, because I feel
certain that the Professor was simply generalizing in his limited time in
order to hurry on to the punch line. The problem just does not seem as
bleak to me as it evidently does to him. There are a number of copyright
exceptions that may be used to help the student film-maker. And, of
course, unless The Simpsons is critical to the work one could always elect
not use it. Alternatively, if it is critical to the work and the work is going
to be sold for a profit, it is not clear that the copyright owners should not
be compensated. Like the Professor, I do not favor allowing the owners of
The Simpsons to gobble up every single dime the work generates; drawing
the line to balance creativity and the commons is the trick.

15. Id. at 769-70.

16. Id. at 770-71.
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V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROPERTY

Despite my sense that Professor Lessig has simplified the problem, I
agree with him on the importance of the commons as a base from which
cultural and intellectual development flow. I am tempted to say that the
importance of the commons has been underestimated, but exactly the
opposite is true. As he notes, there are "extraordinarily large resources"' 7
devoted to making sure Congress continues the trend toward greater
protection both with respect to copyright duration and coverage. These
massive expenditures prove that the value of the commons, or preventing
the commons from developing, is well-known to those in the relevant
industries.
The Professor suggests that there are two explanations for the problem
of the commons. The first is "a boring story about corruption"' 8 and the
second is "much more fundamental" and "has to do with an ambiguity
around the word 'property."" 9 On this second point, I am going to interpret
the Professor as meaning that there is blind societal adherence to the notion
of property as a fundamental right. This seems bizarre in the context of
intellectual property because it is granted conditionally and for a "limited
time." In any case, I disagree with the blind adherence theory (whether his
or my incorrect interpretation) because those in Congress and the judiciary
who are constantly manipulating the meaning of "property" cannot really
be said to have any convictions about the sanctity of "property." In fact, we
might be better off if they did, because it would lessen the likelihood that
they would feel free to change its boundaries whenever it seems politically
expedient to do so.
Ultimately, I am left with the corruption of those whose obsession is
political office or judicial appointment. Let me take a simple example that
is well-known to copyright students. It is the Sonny Bono Copyright
Extension Act.2 ° Among other things, it extends existing copyright
protection by twenty years.2 ' Let's compare this notion of a twenty-year
retroactive extension with the Constitutional language. The Constitution
allows Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."22
It is hard to avoid an interpretation that copyright protection is strictly
a means to an end and the Supreme Court has regularly announced that this
17. Id. at 774-75.
18. Id. at775.
19. Id.
20. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extention Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2003).

22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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is the case.23 One is permitted to internalize benefits in order to provide an
incentive to create. This is about as utilitarian as it gets and, to put aside
any doubt on the matter, it is important to note that the drafters also knew
how to express non-utilitarian principles. One could interpret this
Constitutional provision alternatively to say that Congress is not authorized
to extend copyright protection
in instances in which it does not promote the
24
"Science and useful Arts."
How does a retroactive extension promote what already exists?
Obviously it does not. Let's revisit Gone With the Wind. This work was
published in 1936.25 The term of duration that existed then-a term of
twenty-eight years and a renewal of twenty-eight more 26-was sufficient
to promote the "useful Art" of creating Gone With the Wind. If Margaret
Mitchell had been a business person interested in rational investment
decisions, she would have thought in terms of a possible fifty-six years of
returns. Extending the period beyond fifty-six years is nothing more than
a windfall for the Mitchell estate and cannot be connected in any
meaningful way with a sensible reading of the applicable Constitutional
provision.
There may be objections to this interpretation of events based on the
argument that Congressional action in this case served the national interest.
The argument is that but for the extension, many works, including many
Disney-controlled works, would pass into the commons, not just in the
United States, but internationally. Arguably this would enable foreign users
to exploit a United States-based resource without compensation. In short,
the extension amounted to tariff protection for United States producers.27
I will not attempt to untangle this justification here other than to note that
whatever public interest was at stake seems to be internalized somewhat
privately and that this particular "tariff' was passed at the expense of
having an enduring and economically sensible approach to copyright
duration.
Nevertheless, Congress did extend the copyright period
retroactively-to works that obviously did not need the extra boost-and
the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft28 found the extension was
constitutional. The reasoning of the Court with respect to the impact on
already existing works is, to put it politely, remarkable. According to the
Court, copyright extensions have routinely been retroactive. Thus, an

23. See, e.g., Mazur v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
25. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2003).
27. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 227 (3d ed. 1999).
28. 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003).
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author, say forty years ago, could "reasonably comprehend" that the actual
copyright term was for not the stated period but for that period plus any
extensions that might occur.29 Presumably this means that the retroactive
extension was just a matter of delivering on that "reasonable
comprehension."30
The outcome of this, if it is not otherwise clear, is that we cannot be
confident that the creative commons will be extended by the most logical
and expressly permitted method available-by allowing the copyright to
lapse on works created in a context of internalization that the authors
evidently felt was completely adequate. In a system in which money and
wealth have always determined the definition of "property" and in which
reelection to any "political" office is more important than principle, I am
more pessimistic than Professor Lessig about the survival of the creative
commons or any commons.

29. Id. at 786.
30. An economically motivated and savvy author would determine expected earnings in the
hypothetical retroactive extension and discount those earnings to present value.
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